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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LEGRANDE L. BELNAP,
Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 16849

WALKER BANK &TRUST COMPANY,
in its corporate capacity,
Respondent.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
By this action Walker Bank

& Trust Company seeks

declaratory judgment that its Trust Deed upon Appellant's
residence is a good, valid, and subsisting lien.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Honorable Bryant H. Croft granted Respondent
Summary Judgment on its Counterclaim for declaratory judgment.
At the same time, the Honorable Judge Croft denied Appellant's
Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed Appellant's complaint
wi~h

prejudice.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Respondent disagrees with the characterization of the

facts as set forth by Appellant.

Respondent submits that
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Appellant's statement of many facts is either incomplete~
misleading, or both. 1 Therefore, Respondent submits the
following more complete statement of background and facts.
A.

The Background of Litigation.
On the 28th day of July,

1972~

Utahna P. Belnap died.

She was survived by her four children and her husband, LeGrande
L. Belnap.

LeGrande

L~

_Belnap is the plaintiff below and the

Appellant in this action.
At the time of Utahna P. Belnap's death the record
title to several parcels of real property, including the
marital abode, was in her name alone.

A will which she had

executed on May 21, 1949 and which she had deposited with the
Trust Department of Walker Bank
named Walker Bank

&Trust

estate to her children.

&Trust

Company for safekeeping

Company as executor and left her
LeG~ande

L. Belnap was neither a

beneficiary of a contingent beneficiary under the will.
The foregoing situation spawned five lawsuits, including this case now on appeal.

All but one of the cases were

initially permanently assigned together for efficiency and
economy of proceedings.

lThe mischaracterization begins with Appellant's
first statement, ''The plaintiff's father and mother deeded real
property to the plaintiff by Warranty Deed dated August 1951.
(Supplemental Record p. l.)" A review of the cited record,
however, shows that Utahna P. Belnap was also a grantee under
the deed. Appellant's facts totally ignore that point.
Additionally, Appellant ignores the fact that the referenced
deed was ineffective. (See Point VII, infra.)
-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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'

The first case arose when Walker Bank's Trust Department filed the 1949 will of Utahna P. Belnap for probate.
LeGrande L. Belnap contested that will.

He claimed that the

1949 will had been revoked by a later will which named him as
executor and sole beneficiary.

He alleged the later will had

been executed in his business office and had been witnessed by
two of his employees, the sales manger of his Ford dealership
and his secretary, Doris Bagley, now Mrs. LeGrande L. Belnap.
The alleged later will was never produced or found.
The second case was a forgery and fraud case filed
against Walker Bank and Utahna's father and siblings, LeGrande
L. Belnap v. Walker Bank

&Trust

Company and Newman Petty,

Rachel Lunt, Norma Strasssen, Leila Shipp, Charles B. Petty,
personally and d/b/a Petty Investment Company, Civil No.
209266. Count I of the case involved the marital abode 2 (the
"Home").

Appellant claimed Walker Bank had breached a duty to

record a prior deed to him and Utahna as joint tenants.

He

also claimed that Walker Bank and other defendants had
conspired to deprive him of his interest in the home by
obtaining and causing to be recorded a forged warranty deed
which conveyed title to Utahna P. Belnap alone.

Four other

2All of Lot 6 Indian Hills Subdivision, Plat B-1
according to the official plat thereof.
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counts of the Complaint charged the other defendants, but not
Walker Bank with certain frauds, conspiracies and conversions
of marital property and of his property.
The third case was this case, LeGrande L. Belnap v.
Walker Bank

&Trust

Company, Civil No. 21151.

Via an Amended

Complaint he joined his four children as defendants.

The

Complaint seeks to quiet title in Appellant and to claim damages against Walker Bank for slander of title.

The Complaint

does not designate the capacity in which Walker Bank was being
sued.

At the time the Complaint was filed, Walker Bank was

holder of a Trust Deed Note, and Trust Deed on the Horne securing the Note.
will.

The Bank was also the named executor under the

At about that time Walker Bank had been appointed

special administrator of Utahna's estate for the purpose of
marshalling her assets (including the Horne) and preserving her
estate during the pendency of the will contest.

Consequently,

Walker Bank entered separate appearances; in its corporate
capacity and in its capacity as special administrator of the
Estate of Utahna P. Belnap.
The Bank, in its corporate capacity, counterclaimed to
establish its trust deed as a valid and subsisting first lien
on the property as against any claim or interest of LeGrande L.
Belnap in the Home.
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The fourth and fifth cases involved· certain real
property located in Monticello, California.

In them LeGrande

L. Belnap claimed that Utahna, Newman Petty and others had
deprived him of his interest in that property, part of which
interest was then titled to Utahna P. Belnap.

These cases do

not now concern us except as part of the backdrop against which
this appeal arises.
From the numerous original claims and defendants,
settlements and dismissals leave only this single defendantrespondent.

LeGrande's single remaining action on appeal

herein seeks to invalidcrte the Trust Deed Note and the Trust
Deed held by Walker.

Dismissed from original affirmative

claims in excess of $1,000,000 against the Bank, Appellant
tenaciously seeks to avoid attachment of a Trust Deed lien upon
the Home in a principal amount of $11,694.08. 3
B.

The Documents of Title to the Horne.
Ostensibly on August 23, 1951, Henry Belnap and Ida L.

Benlap, his wife; executed a warranty deed to the Horne conveying it to LeGrande L. Belnap and Utahna P. Belnap as joint
tenants.

(Supplemental Record at 1.)

This deed has been

usually referred to as "the first deed".

The document,

3Exclusive of interest, costs and attorneys' fees
expended in by upholding the Trust Deed's validity.
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however, was notarized by an individual who declared on the
document that his commission as a Notary Public expired January
6, 1951.

The document described the property by a metes and

bounds description.

This document was never recorded.

It is

this document upon which LeGrande L. Belnap claimed in case
209266 and in this case.
On August 22, 1952, a plat for Indian Hills B-1
subdivison was recorded in the Salt Lake County Recorder's
office.
deed.

The plat included the property described in the first
It was made by Henry and Ida L. Belnap and others as

subdividers.

It was not, however, joined by LeGrande L. Belnap

and Utahna P. Belnap.

Rather, LeGrande L. Belnap notarized the

signatures of the subdividers on the plat, all of whom together
declared themselves to be the owners of the property described
thereon.

(Supplemental Record at 105).
Additionally, while Lot 6 of that subidivision roughly

coincides with the metes and bounds description, its perimeters
are different.

(See Appendix "A" to this brief.)

Thus, on or

about August 22, 1952, part of the property claimed by LeGrande
L. Belnap pursuant to his claim under the first deed, was
dedicated to Salt Lake City for use as a public street.
On June 15, 1954, a deed to the Home from Henry and
Ida L. Belnap to "Utahna P. Belnap, a married woman" was
recorded.

(Supplemental Record at 2.)

-6-

It was dated November
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10, 1952.

It bore the subdivision description (Lot 6, Indian

Hills Subdivision Plat B-1).

This deed has usually been

referred to as "the second deed". The signature of Henry
Belnap was genuine. 4 The signature of Ida L. Belnap was
.

.

ingenu1ne.

5

The face of the document indicates that it was
recorded at the request of Walker Bank

&Trust

Company.

Wilford Kimball, an officer of Walker Bank employed at its
Sugarhouse Branch during 1954, states that November 10, 1952
deed was received by the Bank from Utahna P. Belnap in connection with the negotiation of a mortgage and was recorded in the
normal course of the mortgage transaction.
took place on May 27, 1954.
tion.

This transaction

Plaintiff joined in that transac-

(Affidavit of Wilford Kimball dated October 15, 1973;

Belnap Deposition taken October 12, 1973, page 8, lines 21-23;
Record at 80-83.)
Three other deeds are recorded at the Salt Lake County
Recorder's office on which Ida L. Belnap's signature is

41eGrande L. Belnap and his handwriting expert admit
that Henry Belnap's signature is genuine. (See Ben Garcia
Deposition dated 12/18/73 page 24 lines 11-16, Record at 586,
and James S. Lowrie Affidavit, dated February 1, 1974, Record
at 176, 178.
SAll parties and handwriting experts concede that
Ida L. Belnap's signature on the second deed is ingenuine, but
there is controversy as to the effect.

-7-
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ingenuine.

In each instance, the deeds convey real property

from Henry and Ida L. Belnap to strangers to this litigation.
In each instance the signature of Ida L. Belnap was made by
Henry Belnap. 6
The 1954 mortgage on the property was extended on
December 11, 1962.

Appellant jointed in that transaction.

(LeGrande L. Belnap Deposition dated October 12, 1973, page 10,
line 23, page 11, line 8; Record at 585.)

On May 3, 1963, the

outstanding balance on the mortgage was $4,702.68.

On that

date Utahna P. Belnap executed a Trust Deed and a Trust Deed
Note in favor of Walker Bank.

Walker Bank loaned to Utahna P.

Belnap the sum of $30,000.00.

Of this sum, $4,702.68 was

credited to the prior mortgage on which Appellant and Utahna P.
Belnap were obligated, paying it in its entirety.

The balance

of the sum loaned was credited to accounts maintained by Utahna
P. Belnap.

The unpaid balance of the Trust Deed Note as of

January 23, 1974 was $18,460.42, exclusive of Attorneys' fees
and costs of collection.

(Stephen Goalen Affidavit dated

January 23, 1974; Record at 154-162.)

6Henry Belnap wrote the signature of Ida L. Belnap
on the second deed as well as on other recorded documents
according to Leslie King, handwriting expert. (Leslie King
Affidavit, dated 2/1/74; Record at 179-80.)

-8-
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Appellant has acknowledged having purchased other real
property which he placed in Utahna's name alone.

He said the

purpose was "to give her as much protection as possible."
(Deposition of LeGrande L. Belnap, June 24, 1975, p. 8.) 7
C.

The Disposition of the Other Cases.
The will contest was settled by agreement of all the

beneficiaries and heirs of Utahna with approval of the court.
The parties to the settlement were LeGrande L. Belnap and the
children of Utahna P. Belnap.

(Record at 661-669.)

Walker

Bank was not a party to the agreement in any capacity.

The

value of the property division between LeGrande and the
children was roughly equivalent to an intestate treatment of
Utahna's estate.

As between LeGrande L. Belnap and Utahna P.

Belnap's other heirs, the other cases were settled in connection with the will contest settlement.

Thus, the children were

settled out of this case and the Montebello cases were settled.
The settlements granted the Home to LeGrande L. Belnap
so far as the other heirs were concerned.

The other heirs,

7The original deposition was never returned to the
district court. During summary judgment arguments, the absence
was noticed. Respondent supplied both the court and the judge
with copies of its copy. Appellant was to have read, signed
and returned the copy but apparently has not. The court relied
on its copy of the deposition in its memorandum opinion. (See
Record at 541-542.) For purpose of full review, Respondent has
filed its originally notarized copy of the deposition with the
clerk of this court.

-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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however, received an assurance from LeGrand L. Belnap that they
and Utahna's estate would be held harmless from any claim by
Walker Bank on the Trust Deed Note which Utahna gave the Bank
on May 3, 1963.

(Record at 661-669.)

Walker Bank's duty as Special Administrator of the
Estate of Utahna P. Belnap was to secure and preserve the
estate for the benefit of the heirs until the will contest was
terminated and an executor or administrator could be named.
Consequently, when agreement was reached between all the potential heirs, the Special Adminstrator accepted such resolution.
Case No. 209166, the forgery and fraud case instituted
by LeGrande L. Belnap, was not settled.

It was involuntarily

dismissed with prejudice for failure to comply with prior
orders of the court on July 6, 1978, (Supplemental Record at
124).

The dismissal was appealed, but LeGrande L. Belnap

voluntarily dismissed the appeal.

(See Remittiter issued

1-4-79, Docket No. 15985, Supplemental Record at 154.)

The

dismissal of Case No. 298266 is significant because Walker Bank
as Respondent in .this case claims res judicata effect from that
dismissal.

(See Point I, infra. at pp. 11-16).

-10-
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This case came on for pre-trial on September 10,
1979.

8

Since both sides had motions for summary judgment on

file, the court suggested that the motions be heard prior to
beginning the trial.

Both sides agreed.

After an opportunity

for preparation summary judgment motions were heard on
September 11, 1979.
advisement.

The court took the matter under

On November 5, 1979 the court granted summary

judgment to Walker Bank

&Trust

Company.

There are other facts which are germain to each of the
separate arguments.

They will be set out in the arguments

which follow.
ARGUMENT
I.

A.

BOTH APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT AND HIS DEFENSE TO THE
BANK'S COUNTERCLAIM ARE BARRED BY THE OPERATION
OF THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA.

The Doctrine Generally.
The doctrine of res judicata bars Appellant's present

complaint against the Bank.
the

~orgery

The dismissal with prejudice in

and fraud case, Belnap v. Walker Bank

&Trust

Company, et al., Civil No. 209266, operated as an adjudication

8Trial was set for September 10, 1979. At pretrial
settlement conference it was determined that counsel and the
trial judge would utilize the first day set for trial to
delineate issues which would shorten and simplify the actual
trial - an informal pretrial.

-11-
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on the merits as to the issue of the validity of the Banks
Trust Deed.

Such a result is mandated by the Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure, Rule 4l(b):
Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For
failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or comply
with these rules or any Order of court, a defendant may move for a dismissal of an action, or of
any claim against him . . . Unless the Court in
its Order for Dismissal otherwise specifies, a
dismissal under this subdivision and any dismTssal not provided for in this rule, oth~r than a
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indispensible party,
operates as an adjudication on the merits.
(Emphasis Added)
.
Although the forgery case and this action have
substantially identical issues with respect to the Bank in its
corporate capacity, this Court's narrow construction of a
plaintiff's right after dismissal recognizes even a broader
application of res judicata.

Thus, in Belliston v. Texaco,

Inc., 521 P.2d 379 (Utah 1974), this Court reiterated its
previous holdings:
[T]he doctrine of res judicata applie[s] not only
to points and issues which were actually raised
and decided in a prior action but also as to
those that could have been adjudicated, with the
qualification that the claim, demand, or cause be
the same in both cases. If the parties have had
an opportunity to present their case and judgment
is rendered thereon, it is binding both as to
those issues that were tried and to those that
were triable in that proceeding, and they are
precluded from further litigating the matter.9
9rd, at 380. See also Thomas v. Braffet's Heirs, 6
U. 2d. 57, 305 P.2d 507 (1956).

-12-
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allegations of the fraud and forgery case. 11

Finally, appel-

lant's more recent pleadings on file demonstrate the similarity
of the two cases.

For example, in his January 17, 1976

Stipulation (Record at 393), Appellant stipulated with regard
to the then pending cases:
This case [Case Number 211151] involves title to
the home located at 1466 Indian Hills Drive, Salt
Lake City, Utah. LeGrande L. Belnap claims to be
the owner of said home.
"The First Cause of Acton [in Case Number 209266]
involves title to the home located at 1466 Indian
Hills Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, a claim for
damages and other relief.
And, in his August 1, 1978 Objection to the Request for Trial
Setting in this case,

Appell~nt

objected to the request for the

following reasons:
1.

That plaintiff has commenced an appeal in a
related case in the District Court under
Civil No. ,209266, and the issues with
respect to that case may affect the outcome,
if the defense is available in the instant
case.

llrn his Reply to Counterclaim, Second Defense,
paragraph 2, Appellant alleges: "Denies the allegations of
Paragraph 2 and 3 of defendants' counterclaim and further
alleges that said trust deed is void as against the claims of
plaintiff because of the acts which are fully set forth and the
Complaint filed by the plaintiff against the defendant on file
with this Court under Civil No. 209266."

-14-
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2.

The issues in the case pending on appeal
relate to the validity of a mortgage granted
by plaintiff's former wife to the defendant,
Walker Bank & Trust Company, in its corporate capacity.

(Supplemental Record at 420-421)
The Complaints, Counterclaim, Reply to Counterclaim
and other pleadings in these cases demonstrate the identity of
issues.

In the forgery and fraud case, Appellant put into

issue the validity of both the Bank's Trust Deed and the second
deed conveying the home of Utahna P. Belnap alone.

These

matters are now res judicata against him.
Likewise, Appellant's only affirmative defense to the
Bank's counterclaim herein is conclusively established against
him by res judicata.

This follows not only under the generally

broad application of res judicata with regard to Rule 41(b),
but also because the specific issues in dispute here were also
addressed in Case Number 209266.

Each issue presently at bar

was, in fact, raised and adjudicated by the forgery and fraud
case dismissal.
The dismissal with prejudice in Case Number 209266
operates as an absolute bar to any assertion by Appellant in
this case that the Bank's Trust Deed is not valid or that the
second deed was not valid because of alleged forgery.

To the

extent that Appellant's case herein seeks to establish his
title in derogation of the Bank's Trust Deed, he is barred by

-15-
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the dismissal with prejudice of the earlier case.
The proper application of res judicata fully resolves
this appeal against Appellant and renders consideration of the
following arguments unnecessary.
II. APPELLANT'S PLEADINGS PRECLUDE HIS ARGUMENTS ON
APPEAL.
Appellant's arguments in brief, in light of his
pleadings, compel affirmation of the lower court's summary
judgment.

In his brief, Appellant now raises various defenses

to the Bank's Trust Deed based on:
1)

Bank's failure to comply with declaratory

relief statute (Point I);
2)

Actions of the personal representative,

estoppel and the "one action" rule (Point II); and
3)

he forgery of the second deed and the bank's

notice of Appellant's interest under the first deed
(Point III).
The first two arguments are in the nature of affirmative defenses, alleging matters which are not implicit in
Appellant's general denials to the Bank's counterclaim.

But,

Appellant neither pleaded such matters, nor sought to amend or
supplement his pleadings to allege such matters.

Because these

defenses were not raised in his pleadings, Appellant may not

-16-
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now argue them. 12
On the other hand, the third argument addresses and
sets forth his only pleaded affirmative defense - the matters
covered in the forgery and fraud case.
litany on page 24 of his brief:

Thus the familiar

The Bank had notice of

Appellant's interest when Appellant delivered the first deed to
the Bank.

The Bank should have known the second deed was a

forgery and failed to protect itself.

(Compare Complaint

209266, Supplemental Record at ·2-8.)
Even if this Court does not reaffirm its broad
application of res judicata as·set forth in Point I supra, at
the very least, the affirmative defense which is based on the
pleadings of the forgery and fraud case must be determined
against Appellant.
Thus, because of his failure to plead the belated
defenses, and because of the unavailability of the only defense
pleaded, Appellant may not properly argue any of his proposed
defenses on the appeal.

Walker Bank is properly entitled to

summary judgment as a matter of law.

12see Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(h); see
Tygesen v. Magna Water Company, 13 U.2d 397, 375 P.Zd 456
(1962).
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III. EVEN IF ALL APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS WERE ADMITTED,
AT THE VERY LEAST, WALKER BANK HOLDS A VALID LIEN
ON AN UNDIVIDED ONE-HALF OF THE PROPERTY.
Even if Appellant can somehow prevail in his claim
under the defective deed of August 23, 1951, he cannot have the
property free and clear.

This question is settled by the Utah

Supreme Court in the case of Tracy Collins Trust Co. v. Goeltz,
5 U.Zd 350, 301 P.Zd 1086 (1956).

In that case a husband and

wife owned property in joint tenancy and jointly executed a
mortgage on the property.

Thereafter, the husband sought a

second mortgage from another lending institution, Tracy Collins
Trust Company.

As a condition to the loan, the prospective

lender required that the original mortgage be paid and that the
wife join in the new mortgage to it.

The husband, without the

knowledge of the lender, signed his wife's name.

In the

lender's action to foreclose the mortgage after default, the
wife resisted because the mortgage had been executed by the
husband alone.
In Tracy Collins Trust Co. v. Goeltz, the Utah Supreme
Court held that the husband's signature was ineffective to
mortgage the wife's interest.

The Court held, however, that

the mortgage by the husband alone severed the joint tenancy and
created a tenancy in common.

The Court further held that the

wife was liable for, and the entire tenancy in common was

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-18-

subject to a portion of the second mortgage.

The court found

such liability existed to the extent by which the proceeds of
the second mortgage relieved her and her one-half of the
property of the prior obligation.

Finally the Court held that

the husband's undivided one-half interest of the tenancy in
common was subject to the whole amount of the unpaid balance of
the mortgage.
If somehow Appellant prevails on his claim under the
August 23, 1951 deed, Tracy Collins controls this case.

At the

time of the trust deed transaction on May 3, 1963, Utahna
Belnap had an undivided interest in joint tenancy in the
property in question.

Her trust deed transaction severed the

joint tenancy and created a tenancy in common with Appellant,
with each tenant having an undivided one-half interest.

Her

transaction also caused Appellant to be relieved of an
obligation of $4,708.68 as a joint obliger on the mortgage of
the property.

Consequently, if any property passes to

Appellant by virtue of the August 23, 1951 deed, he can only
take an undivided one-half interest as a tenant in common and
that he takes subject to the lien of Walker Bank &Trust
Company in the sum of $4,708.68. 13 Furthermore, the remaining undivided one-half interest in common is subject to the

13p1us statutory interest from May 3, 1963.
Code Annotated, §15-1-1.
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trust deed and the whole unpaid amount of the trust deed note.
Nonetheless, Appellant says that Walker Bank's trust
deed is void because a forged deed was used as security for a
loan to Utahna P. Belnap.

This is not the case.

The Bank took

Utahna P. Belnap's interest in the property as security for a
loan to Utahna P. Belnap.

If Walker Bank was mislead or

mistaken as to the extent of her estate, it is still entitled
to take that which she held at the time.
Section 57-1-4.

Utah Code Annotated,

Moreover, the contrary authority which counsel

for Appellant cites deals with situations where the deeds are
entire foregeries.

Such cases are distinguishable from the

circumstance here.

In this case one grantor's signature is

genuine, and that granter survived the other signator.
Moreover, the party obligating the property had a claim to it
independently of the so called forgery.
IV.

WALKER BANK &TRUST COMPANY IS A PURCHASER IN
GOOD FAITH AND FOR A VALUABLE CONSIDERATION.

Section 57-3-3 of the Utah Code Annotated states:
Every conveyance of real estate hereafter
made, which shall not be recorded as provided in
this title, shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser in good faith and for a valuable
consideration of the same real estate, or any
portion thereof, where his own conveyance shall
be first duly recorded.
In the case of Federal Land Bank of Berkeley v. Pace, 87 Utah
156, 48 P.Zd 480 (1935) this Court held that the term conveyance in the predecessor statute to the above quoted statute
-20-
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included mortgage liens.

There would seem little doubt that it

also includes trust deeds.
In the case now before the Court, Walker Bank took the
Trust Deed 'of Utahna P. Belnap as security for a trust deed
note and loaned the sum of $30,000.00 to Utahna P. Belnap on
May 3, 1963.

At this time, Utahna P. Belnap had been the

record owner of the property for approximately nine years and
the Bank had no knowledge of any defect in the title.

The

Bank's trust deed was recorded on May 8, 1963.
The deed under which Appellant claims was never
recorded.

In his forgery suit, Appellant claimed that Walker

Bank did have notice because Appellant allegedly entrusted the
August 23, 1951, deed to it for recording.

Because of the

dismissal with prejudice the allegation has been conclusively
determined against him, even were it not belied by the record
of Appellant's subsequent involvement in the Plat of the Indian
Hills B-1 subdivision.

And, in any event, at the time the Bank

had the second deed recorded and lent money pursuant to a
mortgage transaction the first deed was unrecordable to
demonstrate any interest in Appellant.

It was unrecordable

both because of the defective acknowledgement and also because
it predated the plat which was signed by the grantors.

That

plat indicated to the world that the grantors, and not
Appellant, still claimed ownership to the property.

In fact,

even if the deed had been recorded, standing alone, it would
-21Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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not have been notice of Appellant's alleged interest.
Norton v. Fuller, 68 Utah 524, 251 P. 29 (1926).

See

Appellant has

not met his burden of raising genuine issues respecting the
Bank's notice of the 1951 deed, nor with the dismissal of the
forgery case can he.

The Bank is a subsequent purchaser in

good faith and for a valuable consideration.
V.

APPELLANT MAY NOT USE THE ACTIONS OF WALKER
BANK IN ITS CAPACITY AS SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR OR ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF UTAHNA
P. BELNAP AS ADMISSIONS BY RESPONDENT IN ITS
CORPORATE CAPACITY IN THIS CASE.

In the Appellant's various actions against it, the
Bank has participated in two capacities.

The Bank has appeared

both in its fiduciary capacity as proponent and named executor
under a Will, and its corporate capacity as a creditor of
Utahna Belnap and a lien holder on potential estate assets.
In the initial stages of the probate proceedings, the
Bank participated as the named executor under the 1949 will
seeking formal appointment as such.

Later, as Special

Administrator and ultimately as Administrator of the estate,
the Bank acted in a fiduciary capacity as representative of the
estate.

In this case, the Bank was sued in both capacities.
Different law firms represented the Bank's independent

interests.

Initially, the firm of Romney, Nelson and Cassity

appeared for the Bank in its capacity as representative of the

-22-
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estate.

(Later, the law firm of Strong

&Hanni

appeared for

the Bank in its capacity as representative of the estate.)

The

Bank's present counsel represented and continues to represent
the Bank in its corporate capacity.

The distinction and

independence of the two separate Bank persona is one of both
form and substance.

The distinction is apparent not only under

the law, but in the handling of these cases as well.
Under the law, the acts of the Bank in the faithful
performance of its duties as representative of the estate are
chargeable to the estate.

A claim against the Bank who has
faithfully performed its duty 14 is a claim against the estate

which must indemnify it.

On the other hand, a claim against

the Bank in its corporate capacity is a claim against the
Bank's own assets.
The statutes and courts of Utah recognize this distinction.

For example, the relevant Utah statutes provide that

all assets held in any fiduciary capacity must be kept separate
15
from the general assets from the Bank.
Former Utah Code
Annotated Section 75-9-15 respecting judgments against the

14p1aintiff stipulated to the dismissal of all of
his claims against the Bank as Special Administrator and,
therefore, must concede its faithful performance of its fiduciary duties.
lSutah Code Annotated §7-5-12.

-23-
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personal representative has been interpreted by this Court to
mean that any judgment so given must be a judgment against the
estate assets only and that entry of said judgment against the
personal representative personally is improper.

Clayton v.

Dinwoodey, 33 U 251, 93 P. 723, 782 (1908).
Because of the separate and distinct nature of the
Bank's two persona, the acts of the Bank as the representative
of the estate are not admissions against the Bank in its corporate capacity.

Such a conclusion is compelled not only by the

general rule which requires the bank as fiduciary to represent
the estate's interests independently of the bank's interests
which might arise from its corporate transactions, but also by
the record of these cases.
In the 1976 Stipulation between Appellant and the
heirs of the estate, the distinction was recognized.

All

claims against the Bank as representative of the estate were
dismissed with prejudice.

The claims against the Bank in its

corporate capacity were reserved for further proceedings.

The

claim of the Bank in its corporate capacity was recognized and
reserved.

And, according to the Stipulation, Appellant agreed

to indemnify and to hold the heirs, the estate and Walker Bank
in its capacity as estate representative harmless from any such
claims.
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In the Second Point of his brief Appellant claims
great prejudice, in that he cannot now reach the estate for
payment of the Trust Deed indebtedness.

Additionally Appellant

seeks to impose acts which the Bank undertook as estate
representative as admissions against the Bank in its corporate
capacity.
record.

Appellant ignores the law, the facts and the
Both Appellant's liability here and the Bank's acts

which are complained of are in accordance with the Stipulation
Appellant executed.

That Stipulation provides in relevant part:

(2) LeGrande L. Belnap shall receive and be
entitled to the home located at 1466 Indian Hill
Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, and shall take said
home subject to the existing mortgage thereon,
which said mortgage LeGrande L. Belnap hereby
assumes and agrees to dischar~e and does hereby ·
indemnify and agree to save t e estate of Utahna
P. Belnap and defendants harmless from any loss,
damage, claims, or liability on account thereof.
The action described in Paragraph V B shall be
dismissed as against Walker Bank &Trust Company
as special administrator of the estate of Utahna
P. Belnap, deceased, and as against her children
with prejudice, provided that the claims against
said bank in its corporate capacity shall be
reserved.
(4) All property, real, personal and mixed,
other than the home referred to in paragraph V B
above and the Montebello property referred to in
Paragraph V C above including, but without
limitation, all other property shown on the
inventory and appraisement filed by the Special
Administrator in Case No. 59387 pending in the
above-entitled court, and all other properties of
every kind or nature owned by Utahna P. Belnap at
the time of her death, known or unknown, or
hereafter discovered or that may be hereafter
acquired, shall belong to the estate of Utahna P.

-25-
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Belnap, deceased, and as to which LeGrande L.
Belnap and Belnap Freight Lines hereby disclaim
and waive any interest therein. All of said
property, real, personal and mixed, belonging to
the estate of Utahna P. Belnap shall be distributed to the defendants, Barbara Sine, LeGrande P.
Belnap, Arlene Waldron and Jaynie Belnap, in
equal shares free and clear of any interest or
claim of LeGrande L. Belnap or Belnap Freight
Lines.
(5) All taxes of every kind or nature that
are due or that may hereafter become due on said
Home . . . B. . . all state inheritance taxes or
federal estate taxes that may be claimed or that
may become payable by reason of any claim that
said Home . . . were assets of Utahna P. Belnap
shall be paid by LeGrande L. Belnap and Belnap
Frei ht Lines, and LeGrande L. Belna and Belna
Freig t Lines o 1n emn1 y an agree to save t e
estate.of Utahna P. Belnap and defendants harmless from any and all loss, damages, claims or
liability on account thereof.
(Record at 393)(Emphasis added)
In accepting the judicial order made pursuant to the
compromise or Stipulation of the heirs regarding the treatment
of the home, the Bank as estate fiduciary was compelled to act
in the best interests of the estate and of the rightful heirs
of the estate.

But such actions taken in "the best interests

of the estate" do not bind third parties whose claims may be
contrary to such a settlement or determination.

This is

especially true where such claims were specifically recognized
and the Appellant expressly indemnified the representative and
held it harmless from any liability on account thereof.

The

Bank's acts as representative of the estate are not admissions

-26-
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against Respondent herein who appears as creditor.

Appellant

may not now claim that the acts taken in reliance on and in
pursuance of such a Stipulation are acts which bind the Bank in
its corporate capacity.
VI.

THE ONE-ACTION RULE DOES NOT BAR THE BANK'S
CLAIM FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF.

In exquisite convolution, Appellant appears to assert
variously that (1) the Bank failed to make a timely claim
against the estate; and/or (2) that when Walker Bank as a
special administrator petitioned the court to make payments on
the promissory note, it did make a claim which violated the
"one-action" rule, and thereby waived its right to the
security; 16 and/or (3) that since the estate disclaimed the
property, the Bank may not have the protection of Utah Code
Ann. §75-3-803(3). 17 In short, Appellant argues that the
Bank should have claimed against the estate, but it did not;

16The one-action rule, as set forth in Utah Code
Ann . §7 8 - 3 7 - 1. provide s as f o 11 ow s : ''There can be but one
action for the recovery of any debt or the enforcement of any
rights secured solely by mortgage upon real estate which action
must be in accordance with the provisions of this chapter."
17utah Code Ann. §75-3-803(3) provides:
"nothing in this section effects or prevents
(a) any proceedings to enforce any mortgage,
pledge or other lien upon property of the estate."
The section generally exempts persons claiming lien
interest in estate property from the necessity of making a
formal claim with the estate.
-27-
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or, that the Bank should not have claimed against the estate,
but it did.
The single action rule does not bar the bank's claim
for declaratory relief herein.

The estate representative's

request for authority to pay a bona fide debt is not an action
under Utah Code Annotated §78-37-1.

This is obvious from the

record that reflects that no one opposed the petition.
Order, Record at 674.)

(See

Indeed, had there been opposition to

the matter, it would have been set for trial and then the Bank
would have been obliged to formulate a foreclosure action to
collect or enforce the debt.

Under the circumstances that

existed, however, such action was unnecessary, inasmuch as
neither Appellant nor anyone else made objections to the
payment.
Appellant's failure to have earlier objected is fatal
to his argument now.

This is especially so since the estate's

payment of the delinquent amounts in fact reduced the lien upon
the home and, thus, increased the value of the property which
Appellant claimed.

Having taken the benefit, Appellant too

belatedly contests the propriety or effect of the payment.
Moreover, in light of Appellant's warrants to the
estate, a claim against the estate would have triggered a claim
by the estate against Appellant to defend and indemnify.
case then would have come full circle.
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VII. APPELLANT CAN RAISE NO GENUINE ISSUE OF
DISPUTE TO OVERCOME THE ADMITTED EVIDENCE
AND LEGAL PRESUMPTIONS THAT VALIDATE THE
SECOND DEED.
A.

The Standard for Summary Judgment.
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

provides that summary judgment shall be rendered
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact, and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
Under the standards for statutory construction the precise
wording, and each and every word, of the rule must be given
significance.
cant.

The terms "genuine" and "material" are signifi-

The terms "genuine" and "material" prevent a litigant

from defeating summary judgment by raising facts or issues
which are irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible at trial.

The

term "genuine" logically encompasses the evidentiary standards
or burdens which the resisting party must meet under the law of
the particular case.
The second ·deed dated November 10, 1952, which
describes the property as Lot 6, Indian Hills sub-division B-1
was recorded on June 15, 1954.
Because the deed was recorded, Appellant must prove
its invalidity by clear and convincing evidence.

Controlled

Receivables, Inc. v. Harmon, 17 U.2d 420, 413 P.2d 807 (1976).

-29-
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Although Respondent admits the signature of Ida Belnap
is not genuine, it submits that such fact, standing alone, does
not invalidate the whole conveyance.
Appellant adduces

~o

And, the evidence which

prove the entire forgery is either

inadmissible or self-serving.

In similar cases this court has

affirmed summary judgment against the person attacking recorded
deeds.

See Controlled Receivables, Inc., supra.

Summary

judgment is proper here because Appellant has failed to adduce
his own clear and convincing evidence that the second deed is
invalid and has failed to address the abundant evidence which
supports the deed's validity.
B.

The Defects of the First Deed.
The property description under the first deed does not

exactly coincide with the dedicated Lot 6.
this brief).

(See Appendix A to

It has not been determined how much difference

these variances between the deed under which Appellant claims
and the Plat make in terms of actual acreage.

It is

demonstrated, however, that the shape of the property described
on the deed is not the same as the shape on the Plat.

The

effect of the differences is that some property under one of
the descriptions will appear as a dedicated street under the
other.
Examination of the first deed under which Appellant
claims discloses that the purported notary public who

-30-
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supposedly notarized the signature of Henry and Ida Belnap on
August 23, 1951 stated on the deed that his commission expired
January 6, 1951.

There was then no proper acknowledgement of

the alleged signatures on that deed because the document on its
face indicates it was not taken before a commissioned notary.
The deed was, therefore, unrecordable.
57-3-1.

Utah Code Annotated,

C.f. Norton v. Fuller, 68 Utah 524, 251 P. 29 (1926).
The Plat for Indian Hills B-1 subdivision was filed

for record on August 22, 1952 with the Salt Lake County
Recorder by Henry and Ida L. Belnap and others.

Although the

property claimed by Appellant was included among the property
dedicated by the Plat, he was not one of the signatories or
dedicators on the Plat who warranted their ownership of the
dedicated property.

However, Appellant notarized that the

signatures of the dedicators, such an act serves as an admission to the world that Appellant made no claim to the property
one full year following the alleged conveyance.
The existence of the August 23, 1951 deed signed by
Ida and Henry Belnap before an expired notary, the existence of
the Plat which was notarized by Appellant and which contains
variances from the deed under which he claims, the recorded
1952 deed and the record of Appellant's own depositions
demonstrate certain factual matters and when the logical
inferences are followed, lead to the following conclusions:

-31-
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1.

That on August 23, 1951, Henry and Ida Belnap

purported to convey the property described in that deded to
LeGrande and Utahna Belnap.
2.

That by August 22, 1952, Henry, Ida and LeGrande

Belnap realized that certain problems were presented by the
purported conveyance:
(a)

It was not recordable because of the defect

in the acknowledgement.
(b)

The property description thereon was not

compatible with the survey which was taken for the
purpose of platting and subdividing the property.
3.

That by August 22, 1952, Henry, Ida and LeGrande

Belnap had reached the following decision:
(a)

To treat the August 23, 1951 deed as null

and void, and to file the Plat in order to get the
development of the subdivision under way.
(b)

To execute a new deed after the approval of

the plat.
(c)
C.

To place the property in Utahna's name alone.

The Validity of the Second Deed.
The deed dated November 10, 1952 carries the property

description which comports to the plat that was by that time in
effect.

It was purportedly executed by Henry Belnap and Ida

Belnap and purportedly conveys the property to Utahna P.
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Belnap.

Leslie King, a qualified handwriting expert states the

signature of Henry Belnap is an authentic signature (Leslie
King Affidavit dated October 16, 1973, Record
that the signature of Ida Belnap is a forgery.

a~

66-75), but
(Leslie King

Affidavit dated February 1, 1974, Record at 179-188.)

Ben

Garcia, a handwriting expert retained by Appellant, agreed in
his disposition to both of these opinions.

(Ben Garcia

Deposition dated December 18, 1973, page 24, lines 11-16,
Record at 586.)

During the deposition of Mr. Garcia, Appellant

stated that he does not contest the authenticity of the
signature of Henry Belnap. 18 (James S. Lowrie Affidavit
dated February 1, 1974 Record at 176,178)

Leslie King further

states that Henry Belnap signed Ida L. Belnap's signature on
that Deed and on three other conveyances of property in the
same locale.

(Leslie King Affidavit dated February 1, 1974,

Record at 179-180.)
D.

Appellant's Evidence.
Henry Belnap, has disavowed the transaction.

Thinking, we believe, to help his son, he has disavowed his own
signature which is verified by two handwriting experts and

18 Additionally, at pretrial proceedings Appellant's
counsel represented and argued that.Appellant did not contest
the genuineness of Henry Belnap's signature, but rather whether
Henry Belnap intended to convey to the named grantee.
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which is admitted by his son, the Appellant.
Affidavit dated June 5, 1973.).

(Henry Belnap

However, the Affidavit of

Henry Belnap is hearsay, and will be subject to exclusion as
evidence of the issue.

Likewise, the deposition of Henry

Belnap is hearsay - having been taken in the early stages of
the probate case, before the Bank became party to these actions
in its creditor corporate capacity.

Thus, Appellant has no

admissible evidence of the alleged forgery even if, despite the
doctrine of res judicata such issues could again be litigated.
And, in any event, the record demonstrates that
Appellant himself and through his expert has admitted the
authenticity of Henry Belnap's signature.

Thus,

H~nry's

signature should be taken as authentic, and no genuine question
of fact exists to the contrary.

Furthermore, the expert

evidence demonstrates that Henry also signed Ida Belnap's
signature on the 1952 deed, as well as on other conveyances
apparently in a normal course of dealing.
Further facts which support the conclusion that the
November 10, 1952 deed is a correct and valid deed and which
Appellant has failed in his burden to overcome, are as
follows:

The November 10, 1952 deed instructs that tax notices

be mailed to Utahna P. Belnap at 1466 Indian Hills Drive, Salt
Lake City, Utah.

It is presumed as a matter of law that tax

notices on the property arrived at Appellant's residence for
eighteen years, without his ever noticing that the Salt Lake
-34-
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County Treasurer listed the property in Utahna P. Belnap's name
alone.

In the same vein, Appellant signed at least one tax

return wherein the property was listed as Utahna P. Belnap's
property.

(Edward G. Richards Affidavit dated October 16,

1973, Supplemental Record at 84-104)

Similarly, that until

1972 Appellant had not discovered the payment of the original
mortgage from the funds secured by the Trust Deed transaction
between Utahna P. Belnap and Walker Bank

& Trust

Company

(LeGrande Belnap Deposition dated October 12, 1973, page 12,
lines 18-22), is inferential of a disregard of the details of
property ownership which even when viewed favorably to
Appellant, is, inconsistent with a belief in ownership of the
property.
When the issues already considered in this brief are
considered together, the logical conclusion is that the
November 10, 1952 deed was a correction deed, designed to
remedy the defect in the acknowledgment in the August 23, 1951
deed, designed to correct the variances between the August 23,
1951 deed and the August 22, 1952 plat; and designed to place
the property in Utahna P. Belnap's name alone, for tax
purposes, for credit purposes or for some other undisclosed
reason.
The conclusion that the 1952 deed is valid follows as
a matter of logic, and it follows as a matter of legal
presumption because the 1952 deed was recorded.
-35-
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trier of fact to consider the forgery issue through the
affidavit and deposition of Henry Belnap, Appellant cannot, as
a matter of law, meet his burden of proof.
CONCLUSION
Summary judgment was proper.

Appellant's arguments to

reverse the summary judgment avoid, overlook and contort the
dispositive facts and law.

For the past eight years, Appellant

has resisted the validity of the trust deed held by Walker Bank

&Trust

Company.

During that time he has brought numerous

actions and allegations.
own litigious spirit.

Now he must accept the effect of his

The factual basis of Appellant's claims

have been conclusively determined against him by the dismissal
with prejudice of his related complaint in Civil No. 209266.
He has failed to properly reserve or bring his other defenses.
In any event, Walker Bank

&Trust

Company's trust deed is valid

under this court's holding in Tracy Collins Trust Co. v.
Goeltz.

The record unequivocally demonstrates that Walker Bank

and Trust Company is a good faith purchaser for value.
Final~y,

as a matter of law, Appellant has not and cannot meet

his burden of proof even were the matter to go to trial.
Summary judgment must be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 20th day of June, 1980.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK

& McDONOUGH

James S. Lowrie
Robyn 0. Heilbrun
Attorneys for Respondent,
Walker Ba~k &Trust Company
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APPENDIX A
(Outline of Disparities
Between the First Deed and the Plat)
By locating on the Plat the approximate point of
beginning as stated in the August 23, 1951 deed the following
disparities are found:
1.
There is a disparity in the first distance to be
covered--the 1951 deed stating 50.95 feet and the plat stating
50.96 feet.
2.
The 1951 deed describes an angle of 66°34'45"
while the Plat describes an angle of 66°31'4". The distance on
this line according to the deed is 134.10 feet, but according
to the Plat it is 134.08 feet.
3.
The next deed description is for an angle of
35°30'E, a distance of 12.96 feet. The corresponding Plat
description does not state the angle, but states the distance
to be 12.97 feet.
4.
The deed then describes a curve to the right on a
defined radius for 159.0 feet, followed by another curve to the
right on another radius for 50.34 feet, followed by another
curve to the right a distance of 89.53 feet to the point of
beginning. The Plat, however, shows a curve on a set radius
for 128.07 feet, a curve to the right on a changed radius for
90.04 feet and a curve to the right on another changed radius,
a distance of 58.49 feet to the point of beginning.
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